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| “Excessive Implementation”: the Grass-root Government and the Operation Logic of Rural Minimum Living Security System |
| KOU Hao-ning1, LI Ping-ju2 |
1.School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Beijing University of Science & Technology, Beijing, 100083;;
2.law and politics department, North China Electric Power University, Baoding, Hebei, 071000 |
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Abstract The operation of China's Rural Minimum Living Security System (RMLSS) is mainly embodied in policy implementation of the grass-root governments. The investigation in Beixian County, Nanxian County, and Ningxian County of Hebei Province reveals there are two stages in policy implementation of RMLSS: the early stage of excessively loose implementation and the late stage of excessively tight implementation. This change reflects the excessive logic in the implementation of the rural minimum living security policies of the grass-root government, namely artificial amplification of the administrative goals set by higher authorities. The grass-root government excessively loosens the requirements when higher authorities request RMLSS should cover all the people who meet the requirements, while excessively tighten the requirements and even totally stop the service when higher authorities call for moderately tight policies. This implementation logic results from the grass-root government's result-oriented behavioral features caused by powerful government, multilevel personnel and fiscal restraint, and weak supervision of administrative process, and the top-down performance evaluation system and promotion mechanism, which makes the grass-root governments add new rules and requirements at every level to ensure that they can fulfill and even overfulfill the task so as to accomplish prominent achievements.
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Received: 18 March 2017
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2017, Vol. 34 
