Abstract：Since the beginning of this century, parliamentary violence has frequently occurred in some countries and regions around the world. From the perspective of law and economics, this paper provides a theoretical explanation to this phenomenon: as the constitutions of most countries contain provisions on parliamentary independence and judicial immunity of parliamentarians, violent strategies have become a low-cost legal choice for parliamentarians to resolve conflicts. The parliamentary violence data from 2000 to 2017 of 27 countries(regions) and the negative binomial regression analysis support the hypothesis that “judicial immunity leads to more parliamentary violence”. One of the major functions of the institution is to reduce the transaction cost in the uncertain world. Therefore, the general implication of the “judicial immunity hypothesis” is that if an efficient institution is cancelled in the form of immunity, the transaction cost of the entire country (region) will increase. The solution is either to eliminate the immunity institution or to adopt a new institution to make up for the institutional deficiency caused by immunity.
蔡一鸣. 司法豁免与议会暴力：基于法经济学的视角[J]. 《深圳大学学报》（人文社科版）, 2019, 36(3): 86-96.
CAI Yi-ming. Judicial Immunity and Parliamentary Violence: from the Perspective of Law and Economics. , 2019, 36(3): 86-96.
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2019, Vol. 36 
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