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| Regulatory Intervention: Government Behavior Logic in Agricultural Industry Governance |
| LIANG Wei |
| School of Sociology/Beijing Social Management Research Base, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing, 100124 |
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Abstract Under the background of accelerating the construction of agricultural power and implementing the rural revitalization strategy, agricultural industry governance has become an essential issue in grassroots governance. Based on the case of the maize seed industry in L County, the paper constructs an analytical framework of “regulatory intervention” from the perspective of government regulation, discusses the practical basis and operation process of agricultural industry governance, and explains the internal logic of agricultural industry governance on this basis. It is found that due to the imperfect market mechanism, the agricultural industry is easy to fall into the dilemma of disorderly development and increased governance risks. Through the management of market entities based on administrative norms, the allocation of production factors based on county society and the prevention and control of industrial risks based on public interests, the county government has reconstructed the market order of the agricultural industry to a large extent and promoted the orderly development of the agricultural industry. In the above governance process, on the one hand, the county government strengthened the government’s ability to restrain multiple subjects through the flexible use of complex regulatory tools, and on the other hand, it built a diversified control mechanism through multiple resource mobilization, laying a foundation for the role of complex regulatory tools. The regulatory intervention provides an important perspective for understanding the governance of the agricultural industry, helps to clarify the ways and limits of government intervention, and has reference significance for accelerating the construction of agricultural power and promoting rural revitalization.
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Received: 04 January 2025
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| About author:: 国家社科基金青年项目“农民土地权益保障与二轮延包政策衔接的社会学研究”（24CSH129） |
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2025, Vol. 42 
