地方政府债务治理提升企业全要素生产率的机制、渠道及效应

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Abstract Since 2015, the reform of local government debt governance has been gradually promoted nationwide. Clarifying the impact of this debt governance reform on enterprise development and its micro-mechanism is of great significance for resolving local debt risks and ensuring stable and healthy economic development. Taking the reform of local government debt governance as a quasi-natural experiment, using the data of A-share listed companies and 284 prefecture-level cities from 2011 to 2021, a double difference model and an intensity DID model are established to explore the impact of local government debt governance on the total factor productivity of enterprises. The results show that local government debt governance can effectively improve the total factor productivity of enterprises, and the intensity of the effect is related to the equity nature of the enterprise, the scale of the enterprise and the local fiscal pressure. The greater the financial impact of the prefecture-level city where the enterprise is located, the more significant the improvement effect. The above-mentioned improvement effect is more prominent in non-state-owned enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and enterprises in areas with greater fiscal pressure. The financing constraint effect and investment guidance effect are important mechanisms by which local government debt governance affects the total factor productivity of enterprises: on the one hand, local debt governance reduces the financing costs of enterprises through debt replacement, curbs the growth of local government hidden debt, and relaxes enterprise financing constraints, thereby promoting the improvement of enterprise total factor productivity; on the other hand, the strict regulations on debt expenditures in debt governance reform can curb the short-sighted behavior of local governments, encourage enterprises to increase R&D investment, and guide highly financialized enterprises to “de-virtualize and move towards real economy”, thereby improving the total factor productivity of enterprises.

Key words： local government debt governance total factor productivity of enterprises financing constraints crowding out effect investment guidance

Received: 23 April 2024

PACS:	F812.5
	F272.5

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Cite this article:

XIAO Jie. The Mechanism, Channel and Effect of Local Government Debt Governance to Improve Total Factor Productivity of Enterprises[J]. , 2024, 41(4): 65-76.

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https://xb.szu.edu.cn/EN/ OR https://xb.szu.edu.cn/EN/Y2024/V41/I4/65

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