Abstract：Government response has the dual attributes of legitimacy and effectiveness, and is a composite of government-public interaction and grass-roots governance. “Non-decision-making capacity” refers to the ability of a power subject to manipulate and guide agenda-setting, interest challenges and potential risks before making decisions. When confronted with the demands and needs of the people, the power subject has the ability to place a particular issue in the decision-making discussion or exclude it from the scope of decision-making by exerting influence, so as to achieve the purpose of risk avoidance, cost reduction, and rationalisation. Non-decision-making ability is influenced by the combination of top-down political pressure, bottom-up public supervision, and autonomous space in the internal and external environments. Under the effect of non-decision-making capacity, the response behavior of the grassroots government is shaped by the characteristics of risk avoidance through the imbalance of power and responsibility, cost-benefit through the calculation of interests, and smoothness through the decomposition of pressure. According to the different states of non-decision-making capacity, the grassroots government flexibly chooses the response behaviors of indifference, procedural reply, moderate negotiation, and transactional communication between the strong and the weak. The influencing factors of non-decision-making capacity, the characteristics of grass-roots government's response behavior and the response types corresponding to non-decision-making capacity together constitute the mechanism of grass-roots government's choice of response behavior.
李永华, 肖传龙. 非决策能力下基层政府回应行为的特征、模式及机制[J]. 《深圳大学学报》（人文社科版）, 2024, 41(2): 87-96.
LI Yong-hua, XIAO Chuan-long. The Characteristics, Patterns and Mechanisms of Response Behaviors of Grassroots Governments under Non-decision-making Capacity. , 2024, 41(2): 87-96.
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