The Competitive Characteristics of Platform Economy and the Direction of Regular Supervision
REN Xiao-cong1,2, YU Zuo1
1. Research Center of Industrial Organization and Enterprise Organization, Northeastern University of Finance and Economics, Dalian, Liaoning, 116012; 2. School of Economics, Liaoning University, Shenyang, Liaoning, 110036
Abstract：The regular supervision of platform economy can expand the space for economic development, better utilize the endogenous innovation capacity of platform economy to drive economic development, and promote full and reasonable utilization of social resources. Under the framework of endogenous innovation analysis, the platform can be divided into value-creating platform and vale-increasing platform. The profit mode of the former is to enhance the value of new commodities through technological innovation, and the market competitiveness is manifested as technological competition or creativity competition. The most powerful competition policy of the latter is to reduce prices, and market competitiveness is reflected in price competition. The regular supervision of platform economy should pay attention to the development frontier of platform economy actively, and flexibly balance innovation and supervision; Promote collaborative governance and create a model of coordinated regulation that integrates public and private sectors; Classify and implement targeted policies to reasonably determine the boundary of platform responsibility and supervision. Specific to the regular regulatory policies of different types of platform economy, the regular regulation of the economy of value-creating platform should pay attention to dynamic competition. Factors such as market share and duration can no longer be regarded as important regulatory objects, but the key factors are whether to restrict the flow of “creativity” factors, whether to open to later competitors, and the level of entry threshold. On the other hand, the regular economic regulation of value-increasing platform should pay attention to price competition and adopt prior supervision to avoid the serious negative impact of platform violations on the market.
任晓聪, 于左. 平台经济的竞争特征及常态化监管方向[J]. 《深圳大学学报》（人文社科版）, 2023, 40(2): 69-77.
REN Xiao-cong, YU Zuo. The Competitive Characteristics of Platform Economy and the Direction of Regular Supervision. , 2023, 40(2): 69-77.
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2023, Vol. 40 
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