Abstract：Since 1990s, the investment supervision system of Shenzhen has gone through three stages, centralized supervision, decentralization of some investment authorization, and clear rights and responsibilities of SOEs investment decision. It is characterized with delegation of decision-making authorization, market-oriented decision-making, and determination of the boundaries between rights and responsibilities in investment supervision. The sample data reveal “centralized supervision” is not favorable for SOEs investment; with some authorization delegated, investment has dramatically increased in terms of scale and benefits. With a clear boundary between the rights and responsibilities of SOEs investment decision-making, investment scale and investment benefits have increased even further. Thus it is shown that the transaction cost reduction resulting from the changes of the investment supervision system is the basis for SOEs to increase investment benefits. The adjustment and improvement of the investment supervision system of state-owned economies with different functions is the direction for the SOEs investment supervision system in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.
产耀东. 深圳经济特区国有企业投资监管制度的演变及效果分析[J]. 《深圳大学学报》（人文社科版）, 2016, 33(3): 25-28.
CHAN Yao-dong. The Evolution and Effect of the Investment Supervision System of SOEs in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. , 2016, 33(3): 25-28.
2016, Vol. 33 
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