Abstract：Backward induction is a common method to analyze the dynamic game with perfect information and draw inevitable conclusions with complete induction. However, when used to analyze the centipede game, the theoretical prediction deviates from the actual behaviors in real games, resulting in paradox. The centipede game has an intricate and delicate structure. Players deliberate the payoffs and intend to cooperate in the non-cooperative game, which influence their belief change when making decisions. Subjects do not have absolute rationality in reality, the subjective sensation along with belief change determines whether or not the subject believes his decision is rational. According to the theory of belief revision, a general analytical framework can be constructed to describe causes of the decision making in the centipede game.
[1] Robert J. Aumann. On the Centipede Game [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 1998,(23):97-105. [2] 谢识予. 经济博弈论[M]. 上海:复旦大学出版社, 2007. 162-164. [3] Robert W. Rosenthal. Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-Store Paradox [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1981,(25): 92-100. [4] Ken Binmore. Game Theory and Social Contract [M]. MIT Press,1993.20-29; 230-134. [5] 张峰.逆推归纳法悖论探析[J].福建论坛(人文社会科学版),2004,(12):78-81. [6] Gary Bornstein, Tamar Kugler, Anthony Ziegelmeyer. Individual and group Decisions in the centipede game: Are groups more “rational” players? [J]. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2004, 40(5): 299-605. [7] Richard D. McKelvey; Thomas R. Palfrey. An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game [J]. Econometrica, 1992,(60)4: 803-836. [8] 饶育蕾,张媛,彭叠峰.利他偏好是否导致博弈均衡的偏离——对蜈蚣博弈实验的解释[J].系统管理学报,2010,19(6):666-683. [9] Alchourron, C.E., Gardenfors, P, Makinson, D. On the logic of theory change: partial meet contraction and revision functions[J]. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1985, 50(2):510-530.
2016, Vol. 33 
粤公网安备44030502007936号