冷战后资本主义阵营衍化：进程、特征及影响

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Abstract Over the past 30 years, the capitalist camp has not collapsed with the end of the Cold War, but has continued to evolve. In the first stage of its evolution (the period of drifting, cohesion, and optimization), the capitalist camp went through the period of uncertainty when it was not sure about whether it was necessary to retain the camp to the period of consolidation and rapid expansion of the camp at the same time. Its function shifted from defensive to aggressive. In the second stage (the period of weakness and adjustment), the camp went weak on external expansion while internal division and power struggle intensified, and it was torn between dispersion and cohesion. In the third stage (the period of dramatic internal strife), the conflicts between member states and the dominant countries in the capitalist camp became increasingly prominent. It showed a clear sign of dissolution, but countries within the camp, on the whole, were in an ambiguous relationship. The primary reasons for the evolution of the capitalist camp are that the United States defends its global hegemony and benefits from it, that the Cold War mentality based on the recognition of Western liberal and democratic values is at work, and that member states benefit from the camp. In the long run, the evolution of the capitalist camp hinders the benign transformation of world structure and threatens world peace and development. Hostility toward China is the norm in the capitalist camp. Its member states cooperate with China due to the conflicts in the camp, which is an expedient choice driven by national interests. Its dissolution and periodical predicament are beneficial to the multi-polarization of the world structure and the peaceful development of China.

Key words： capitalist countries evolution process Cold War mentality Western values of democracy and freedom international situation multi-polarization

Received: 20 August 2020

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K103

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NIU Wei-gan. Evolution of the Capitalist Camp after the Cold War: Process, Characteristics and Influence[J]. , 2021, 38(1): 89-102.

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https://xb.szu.edu.cn/EN/ OR https://xb.szu.edu.cn/EN/Y2021/V38/I1/89

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