政府风险投资的功能深化与风险隐现

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Abstract Government venture capital, as a core instrument of the national innovation strategy, is increasingly demonstrating its theoretical and practical value in driving technological breakthroughs, facilitating industrial upgrading, and achieving high-level self-reliance in science and technology. The functional deepening of government venture capital manifests dual characteristics of patient capital and resilient capital. The patient capital function is reflected in tolerance for failure and early-stage strategic planning at the front end of investment, staged capital infusion and dynamic risk management at the middle stage, as well as diversified exit strategies and value capture at the back end. The resilient capital function is realized through vertical efforts in tackling critical technology bottlenecks and strengthening industrial chains, horizontal regional diversification and geopolitical risk diversification, as well as the construction of an innovation ecosystem and industrial synergy in the network dimension. However, government venture capital also harbors systemic risks in practice, primarily manifested as policy goal distortion caused by institutional embeddedness contradictions, multi-tiered principal-agent problems arising from power structure imbalances, and insufficient dynamic adaptability due to lagging governance capabilities. A comparative analysis of international experiences reveals that despite divergent paths in the American, European, and Asian models, they all face challenges from technological nationalism and the convergence of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) standards, providing important insights for the future development of global government venture capital. Therefore, China should focus on optimizing the top-level design and strategy implementation of government venture capital, enhancing its ability to coordinate with global rules, and guiding capital recipients to take proactive actions. These efforts aim to achieve a multi-dimensional balance between public policy objectives and market laws, providing theoretical support and practical guidance for resolving the“policy paradox” of government venture capital and enhancing national innovation efficiency.

Key words： government venture capital patient capital resilient capital institutional embeddedness dynamic gov-ernance global collaborative governance

Received: 20 June 2025

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	CHEN Jiang-hua
	TANG Qiu-yu

Cite this article:

CHEN Jiang-hua,TANG Qiu-yu. Functional Deepening and Emerging Risks of Government Venture Capital[J]. , 2025, 42(5): 75-86.

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https://xb.szu.edu.cn/EN/ OR https://xb.szu.edu.cn/EN/Y2025/V42/I5/75

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