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| Moral Decision-Making in Public Reason: An Insight from Contractualism |
| CHEN Ya-wen |
| Jao Tsung-I Institute of Culture Studies, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, Guangdong 518060 |
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Abstract In the structure of public reason, the concept of “reasonable persons” plays a central role, requiring a highest-order framework for moral reasoning on participants, particularly in distinguishing between private and public knowledge. However, this requirement faces challenges at both the empirical and normative levels, especially in addressing deep-seated value disagreements among individuals. Thomas Scanlon's contractualist approach offers a response to these challenges. On the one hand, contractualism corresponds with Rawls's aim of public reason; on the other hand, contractualism provides two innovative contributions: first, it reveals the complex structure of reason-based practical reasoning; second, it elucidates the priority of “reasonableness” from a motivational perspective. Nonetheless, the contractual interpretation of public reason faces three challenges: theoretical redundancy, the appropriate understanding of the nature of moral relationships, and how contractualism can coherently align with the practical role of public reason. I argue that contractualism is not redundant; rather, its theoretical framework bridges individual reasons and public reasons.
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Received: 20 February 2025
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2025, Vol. 42 
