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| Governance Dilemmas and Institutional Responses to Information Cocoons of Algorithmic Consumers |
| GUO Ming-rui, LOU Yi-hua |
| Law School, Shandong University, Qingdao, Shandong, 266200 |
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Abstract Algorithms have transformed the landscape of consumer rights protection, and the information cocoon has emerged as a key factor affecting the realization of consumer rights. While the information cocoon exacerbates the risk of mismatched information needs among consumers, it also alters operators' competitive strategies of offering high-quality and low-cost products and their business model of same price for the same product. However, relying solely on consumers' right to know, right to independent choice, and right to refuse automated decision-making cannot fully meet the governance needs of the information cocoon. In addition to insufficient institutional supply, the governance of the information cocoon also faces obstacles such as the failure of information disclosure models, the lack of legal basis for technical supervision, and blurred governance boundaries in interactive decision-making. Based on this, there is an urgent need to construct a specialized governance system for the information cocoon to bridge the gaps in protection. The construction of the information cocoon governance system should follow the idea from the abstract to the specific. When determining the institutional framework, the governance purpose should be to enable consumers to control the transaction field, take the platform's information pushing behavior as the governance object, and solve the existing governance problems through a risk-responsibility collaborative model. When formulating specific measures, it is necessary to rely on the institutional framework of information cocoon governance, resolve governance obstacles by adjusting the information empowerment model, promoting the integration of algorithm ethics and legal obligations, and clarifying the forms of harm and liable subjects, so as to provide an effective way for algorithmic consumers to break free from the cocoon.
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Received: 01 June 2025
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2025, Vol. 42 
