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| The Mechanism and Effect of Digital Governance Enhancing County Government Policy Enforcement |
| YU Lian1, YUAN Ming-bao2 |
1. College of State Governance, Southwest University, Chongqing, 400715;
2. Rural Revitalization Strategy Research Institute, Southwest University, Chongqing, 400715 |
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Abstract With the rapid development of digital technology, it is common for governments at all levels to choose digital technology to enhance the policy enforcement and advance the governance effect. Take S county of Zhejiang Province for example, the application of government affairs intelligent management platform system has significantly improved the accuracy of policy goals, policy implementation and policy evaluation, achieved accurate governance of the whole cycle of project implementation, and significantly enhanced the county polices enforcement.The key mechanism of digital governance enhancing county polices enforcement lies in the power centralization mechanism in information transmission, the backward supervision mechanism in policy implementation and the promotion incentive mechanism in assessment and evaluation. Specifically,through the way of pre-planning, in-process supervision and post-evaluation, digital technology has been fully embedded in important tasks, projects and work of high concern to the Party and government leaders, and the problem of unclear powers and responsibilities and buck-passing between different departments and different levels of governments has been resolved. The effective application of digital intelligent system has reshaped the governance responsibility of counties and villages, reconstructed the organization and mobilization ability of counties and villages, and made “strip-block segmentation” move to “strip-block linkage”. Digital governance and digital government have formed mutual embedding, and a coordinated county government has been built. However, while attaching importance to the enabling role of digital technology in county governance, it is necessary to be alert to the digital distortion and digital prison that may be caused by over-reliance on digital governance, as well as to prevent the digital Leviathan brought by digitization of all issues.
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Received: 30 July 2022
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2023, Vol. 40 
