数字平台“内卷式”竞争的生成机理与竞争法因应

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Abstract Driven by the combined effects of two-sided network effects and capital, “involutionary” competition in the digital platform sector continues to intensify. Unlike the price squeezes triggered by production capacity pressures in the manufacturing sector, “involution” in the platform context manifests as competition among platforms over low prices and traffic, homogenized imitation among operators within platforms, and the cascading of operational pressures from platforms to the inner layers of their ecosystems. This raises market entry barriers, weakens incentives for innovation, and constrains the sustainable development of the platform economy. The mechanism behind this “involutionary” competition lies in the fact that price signals are constantly amplified by algorithms, while competitive incentives in areas such as quality, technology, and service are squeezed out. Platforms induce businesses to continuously invest in exposure competition by expanding public traffic and implementing pricing arrangements for private traffic. Furthermore, platforms abuse their authority to formulate and enforce rules, influencing transaction conditions and resource allocation to create exclusionary arrangements. The key to resolving this dilemma lies in breaking the self-reinforcing cycle of “price-traffic-rules.” In terms of institutional responses, it is necessary to clarify the antitrust law standards applicable to predatory pricing among platforms and low-price “involution” behaviors such as platform-led most-favored-nation treatment, while improving the coordination with the Anti-Unfair Competition Law. At the same time, traffic allocation should be incorporated into the scope of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, promoting traffic distribution mechanisms guided by performance metrics and quality indicators. Furthermore, by applying Article 21 of the newly revised Anti-Unfair Competition Law, platforms’ obligations to ensure fair competition should be established, and differential treatment without justifiable grounds should be prohibited.

Key words： "Involutionary" competition low-price competition traffic allocation platform power fair competition rules competition law

Received: 25 February 2026

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	ZHU Gong-huan

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ZHU Gong-huan. The Mechanisms Behind “Involutionary” Competition in the Digital Platform Sector and Solutions Under Competition Law[J]. , 2026, 43(3): 122-133.

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https://xb.szu.edu.cn/EN/ OR https://xb.szu.edu.cn/EN/Y2026/V43/I3/122

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