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| The Generation, Structure, and Characteristics of Value Thinking |
| Li Jiang-ling1, Yang Gui-sen2 |
1. School of Marxism, Guangdong University of Education, Guangzhou, Guangdong, 510303;
2. School of Marxism, Huizhou University, Huizhou, Guangdong, 516001 |
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Abstract Value thinking is a thinking paradigm in which the subject grasps the relationship between value and efficacy based on activities and plays an important role in cognition. Understanding of value thinking in Western philosophy has evolved through three stages: virtue ethics, subjective thinking, and value philosophy. Regarding the generation of value thinking, there are three theoretical paradigms: a priorism, empiricism, and constructivism. Apriorism holds that value is a kind of transcendental existence, and empiricism argues that value originates from sensory experience, and constructivism claims that value is a product constructed by power, language, and culture. From the perspective of Marx's practice, value thinking is grounded in biological neurology, intrinsic psychology, and social interaction. It is a historical process generated by the force of neural responses, cognitive construction, culture shaping, and practical feedback. On the one hand, the generation of value thinking is the result of historical and cultural transmission from a diachronic perspective. Specific value thinking is transferred from the generations via particular cognitive frameworks, ethical norms, and social institutions. On the other hand, the generations stem from practical activities in value-based life in a synchronic perspective. Value thinking exhibits not only a horizontal structure comprised of the subject, object, and medium of value thinking, but also a progressive structure consisting of value cognition, value evaluation, and value selection. With the object being the relationship to value and the goal grasped to efficacy, the essence of value thinking is relational. Whose logic involves value judgment, value justification, value conflict, and value resolution. Meanwhile, the evaluation criterion is rationality. The social functions of value thinking are value cognition, value assessment, value guidance, value motivation, and value regulation.
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Received: 21 May 2025
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2025, Vol. 42 
