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The Social Origins and Evolutionary Path of Institutional Effectiveness: A Study Based on the Water Rights of Four Communities and Five Villages in Shanxi Province |
LIU Sheng-zhong |
School of Literature and Law,Nanchang Hangkong University, Nanchang, Jiangxi, 330063 |
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Abstract Institutional effectiveness is a key concept in analyzing social development issues. There are at least three basic criteria for the effectiveness of a system, which are duration, equilibrium stability, and self-implementation. The institutional effectiveness that meets these three standards can be revealed from three aspects: geographical environmental, initial generation methods, and subsequent stabilization methods. The special geographical environment determines the scope and results of institutional choices, and institutional initial generation inevitably contains specific violent genes. More importantly, these systems containing violent genes often need to go through a special process of legalization to achieve lasting effectiveness. The legalization of institutions generally includes three paths: textual institutionalization, sanctification of rituals, and stabilization of interest balance. The water distribution system in the Four Communities and Five Villages of Shanxi Province is a typical case that basically meets the three standards of effectiveness system. It spontaneously formed in specific geographical areas and has continued for more than a thousand years, still maintaining vitality to this day. The social root of the effectiveness of this system lies in the relatively remote and arid geographical environment which plays an externally restrictive role, the violent struggles between different villages that led to the formation of the initial institutional framework, and the legal means to continuously stabilize the effectiveness of the system in subsequent development. The means of legalizing the system include the textual implementation of inscriptions and water conservancy books targeting the water distribution system, the sanctification of annual rituals for worshipping the Dragon King, and the balancing of interests through mutual game and compromise among villages.
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Received: 02 April 2024
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