制度逻辑间的非兼容性与基层市场监管的变通执行

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Abstract The inspection of the implementation of “double randomness, one openness” institution involves not only understanding the logic of grassroots regulatory behavior, but also judging the rational process of national governance. Based on the observation of the implementation by the Market Supervision Bureau of S County, it was found that the modern governance logic based on the institution cannot be compatible with the overall governance logic of the country, resulting in their unwillingness and inability to use “double randomness” as the basic regulatory method; due to compliance with the overall stability and development of local governments, it is impossible for them to disclose punishment information in accordance with regulations. Constrained by multiple and incompatible institutional logics at the national and local levels, especially the “local overall situation” logic, the grassroots regulatory authorities’ behavior does not follow a linear logic from seeking rent to following procedures to avoid responsibility, but rather has multiple and ever-changing faces. The flexible implementation at the grassroots level ultimately leads to two “unintended consequences”: the country’s risk-free goals are replaced by the professional risk-free goals of grassroots regulators, and the country’s modern regulatory system reform is alienated into a tool for serving local stability and development. The fundamental solution to the problem of flexible implementation lies in optimizing the government’s responsibility system, streamlining the relationship between central and local governments, as well as between local governments and society and the market, so that regulatory personnel have the motivation and ability to implement the country’s rational institutional design, and effectively promote the rationalization and modernization of governance.

Key words： market supervision flexible implementation institutional logic incompatibility overall governance modern governance unintended consequences

Received: 27 October 2023

PACS:	D630
	F203

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LIU Pei-wei. The Incompatibility between Institutional Logics and the Flexible Implementation of Grassroots Market Supervision[J]. , 2024, 41(1): 94-102.

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https://xb.szu.edu.cn/EN/ OR https://xb.szu.edu.cn/EN/Y2024/V41/I1/94

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