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| The Thought Experiment of “Cloud Landscape” and Its Application in Social Ontology |
| CHEN Chang-shen |
| School of Philosophy and Sociology, Shanxi University, Taiyuan, Shanxi, 030006 |
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Abstract Social ontology is one of the frontiers of contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of social science. Around the thesis of material constitution and material composition, a series of thought experiments on “Cloud Landscape” has had a profound influence on contemporary metaphysics. For this reason, two approaches have been formed: one is the mereological analysis, which focuses on whether the composition of things is restricted or not; the second is identity analysis, which focuses on whether there is some kind of identity criteria for temporal-spatial contingent objects. However, based on the mainstream position of mereological identity, it is difficult to respond to the challenge from the two principles of “constitution without composition” and “constitution is not identity”. Both aspects of mereological identity assume an anthropocentric position, so all that is needed for a robust realism about clouds is a concept of “relative sortal identity”, for which the concept of “possible worlds” is introduced. With the help of Epstein's “anchoring-grounding” model, Barnes's “ontological emergence” and Dasgupta's generalism, the presupposition of reductionism and individualism behind the mainstream position can be overcome. Thus, this approach to “cloud landscapes” is not only applicable to so-called natural species such as clouds but also powerfully characterizes the ontological characteristics of social facts and social groups. Finally, it shows that the “cloud landscape” of social facts and social groups must be based on the rejection of the mereological identity thesis.
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Received: 31 March 2023
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2023, Vol. 40 
