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| The Illusion and the Truth of the Self/Less：Thought Experiments on the Relationship between Mind and Body |
| ZHU Guang-ya1,2 |
1. Philosophy Department, East China Normal University, Shanghai, 200241;
2. College of Marxism, Yango University,Fuzhou,Fujian,350015 |
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Abstract The relationship between body and mind has been repeatedly discussed by thinkers and some prospective ideas have been formulated with thought experiments. These experiments, scattered in the works of thinkers and reflected in literary and artistic works, have triggered new questions: Is it possible for humans to maintain the identity of mind and body with the infinite development of science and technology? “ZHUANG Zhou’s dream of becoming a butterfly” is the beginning of Chinese people’s examination of the relationship between mind and body, and it establishes the basic idea for Chinese people, especially the Taoists, to treat the relationship between mind and body. In contrast, at the beginning of Western philosophy, body and mind were opposite. After Socrates’ subject-object dichotomy of “knowing yourself,”this binary cognitive mode was finally established by Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”. This conception of the opposition between mind and body was taken to an extreme in Putnam’s thought experiments of “the brain in a vat”: there is probably a hard barrier between body and mind. However, the rapid development of science and technology poses us a new question: Is it possible for humans to achieve the identity of body and mind by means of technology? Although the illusion and the truth of the self/less is a breakthrough in the relationship between body and mind, it cannot answer the old questions which we have long thought about: What is the body? Who am I?
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Received: 09 March 2020
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2020, Vol. 37 
