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Ten Major Relationships in China’s Local Governance Innovation |
CHEN Ke-lin, GU Zhi-jun |
College of Urban Governance, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, Guangdong, 518060 |
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Abstract In the decisive period of building a well-off society in an all-round way, innovation-driven development is becoming the core strategy for china’s national development. Local governance innovation at the center of practice and theory still faces many prominent practical problems. Based on the review of relevant theories and practices, we can abstract and summarize the deeper logical relationships behind the innovation practices of local governments as follows: the hierarchical relationship of technology, system and governance innovation; the dialectical relationship of creation, destruction and governance innovation; the purpose relationship of success, failure and governance innovation; the fundamental relationship of truth, falsehood and governance innovation; the strained relationship of law, system and governance innovation; the gaming relationship of power, interest and governance innovation; the interactive relationship of the market, society and governance innovation; the advancement relationship of spontaneity, enforcement and governance innovation; the impetus relationship of pressure, change and governance innovation; the development relationship of short-term planning, long-term vision and governance innovation. The relationship between these variables is of great significance for understanding and guiding the theory and practice of local governance innovation. In terms of goal setting, China's local governance innovation should follow the path of multi-level coordination and orderly management, aim at good governance and promotion of common good. Besides, we also need to be committed to system construction and rule of law, proactive in innovation and have a long-term vision.
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Received: 11 August 2018
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