Abstract：The identification of antitrust civil litigation eligibility requires appropriate policy-based legal techniques, and the coordination of procedural law and competition law, as well as the conformity of procedural eligibility and substantive policies. In judicial practice, the United States adopts legal techniques such as direct infringement and antitrust damage as the criteria for determining antitrust civil litigation eligibility, confusing procedural eligibility and substantive criteria. We should be cautious about the application of using similar criteria in China. From the perspective of procedural law, the inclusion of substantive criteria on damage will raise the bar on prosecution conditions, which does not help promote the private implementation of antitrust law. China should remove the substantive standards on damage and lower the bar on prosecution conditions to cultivate a good competition culture. From the perspective of substantive liability structure, treble damage system is not introduced in China’s liability consequence law to encourage victims to protect their rights, which is not an effective deterrence to proprietors. Therefore, it is not appropriate to attach other conditions to damage to drive up the standards of antitrust civil litigation eligibility. Instead, we need to simply take damage as the standard to lower the requirements for prosecution, lower the bar on liability determination, and adopt effective deterrence strategies for monopolists. Only with the combination of procedural law and substantive law can we properly identify antitrust civil litigation eligibility.
王磊. 程序法与实体法协动视野下的反垄断民事诉讼资格[J]. 《深圳大学学报》（人文社科版）, 2022, 39(6): 87-96.
WANG Lei. Antitrust Civil Litigation Eligibility from the Perspective of Procedural Law and Substantive Law. , 2022, 39(6): 87-96.
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