Abstract：There is a consensus among researchers on the passive administration of the neighborhood committee in a pressure-based system, but academics do not have sufficient analysis of the “pressured-based system” in terms of internal logic. This paper integrates the two analysis models of “pressure-based system” and “distribution of control rights”, and takes Yijie as an example to analyze the evolution and internal logic of the “passive administration” process of the neighborhood committee in traditional street-community system. The findings show that the street effectively weakens the autonomy of the neighborhood committee through the incentive system design under the incentive compatibility principle, the autonomous switch between the conventional mode and the mobilization mode, the financial office of the street managing the financial affairs of the neighborhood committee (including financial appropriation and venture philanthropy), as well as the selection and evaluation of community workers under the current selection and appointment system. All these measures and effective coordination presents the whole picture of the passive administration of the neighborhood committee. The neighborhood committee faces pressure from the street office, and extension of vertical functional departments. Besides, the financial affairs of the neighborhood committee are subject to the management of the street financial office, and the system of “the combination of selection and employment” gradually erodes its structure. All these changes make passive administration of the neighborhood committee an inevitable result.
侯利文. 压力型体制、控制权分配与居委会行政化的生成[J]. 《深圳大学学报》（人文社科版）, 2020, 37(3): 111-120.
HOU Li-wen. Pressure-Based System,Distribution of Control Rights and Passive Administration of Neighborhood Committees. , 2020, 37(3): 111-120.
2020, Vol. 37 
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