Perquisites and Corporate Performance:Agent View or Efficiency View, Research Based on the Perspective of Executive Incentive
SU Ran1, GAO Minghua2
1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China; 2.Research Centre for Corporate Governance and Enterprise Development, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
Abstract：There are two views on how perquisites influence the corporate performance, namely, the agent view and the efficiency view. Studies on the relationship among executive salary, perquisites, and corporate performance show that different levels of executive salary lead to different relationships between perquisites and corporate performance. In general, the efficiency view is more effective when executive monetary incentive is inadequate, that is, perquisites lead to higher corporate performance; and the agent view is more effective when executive monetary incentive is excessive, that is, perquisites bring negative impacts on the corporate performance. This article suggests that a balanced executive incentive policy should be considered if the optimal corporate performance is to be achieved.
苏 然，高明华. 在职消费与公司绩效：代理观还是效率观——基于高管激励视角的研究[J]. 《深圳大学学报》（人文社科版）, 2015, 32(2): 102-109.
SU Ran, GAO Minghua. Perquisites and Corporate Performance:Agent View or Efficiency View, Research Based on the Perspective of Executive Incentive. , 2015, 32(2): 102-109.
2015, Vol. 32 
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