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| The Mode Choice and System Preparation after Flexible Use of Procuratorial Investigation Power |
| GUO Jing |
| College of Law and Criminology, Chinese People’s Public Security University, Beijing, 100038 |
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Abstract The reform of the national supervisory system and the amendment of criminal procedure law in 2018 have greatly weakened procuratorial and investigation power, and procuratorial organs are flexible in the use of investigation power. Based on whether the original case-handling authority has committed illegal or slack“errors”, procuratorial organs are flexible to choose direct investigation or follow-up investigation. The follow-up investigation mode focuses on curbing the inaction of the original investigation authorities, and has many advantages incomparable to direct investigation in terms of practical value, implementation difficulty, operability and social benefits,but it is not ready to effectively implement the follow-up investigation mode at the institutional level. In order to build an effective pattern of follow-up investigation, it is necessary to take following measures: simplify the determination criteria for liability judgment and procedure presumption in “inaction detection and investigation”; improve decision procedure and set up a mechanism for interested parties to “appeal in advance”; treat the conclusion of preliminary investigations with caution, so as to improve the starting standard, decision-making procedure and legal effect of procuratorial investigation power.
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Received: 20 August 2019
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2020, Vol. 37 
