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Ideological Symptoms and Governance of Tanking Culture |
LIN Feng |
School of Marxism, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing, 401120 |
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Abstract “Tanking” is a behavior where the parties involved abandon themselves, let themselves go, and let the situation develop. As a way of life, “tanking culture” is a fashionable pragmatism, refined egoism attitude and coping style with the value orientation of “avoiding shameful but useful”. It is a collection of complex social mentality that young people face when they face the gap between ideal and reality, effort and gain, success and failure. Among them are the jokes and self-mockery of “Diaosi”, the deconstructive irony of “Spoof”, the negative decadence of “Geyou Lie”, the desireless and desireless of “Buddhism”, as well as the inferiority and frustration of “Feichai” and the cynic escapes of “Lying Flat”. It can be seen that the “tanking culture” reflects a strong sense of powerlessness and a general sense of loss of control that youth groups have when they face difficulties and encounter setbacks. The culture of tanking has a distinct ideological color, presenting an ideological significance of resisting the tyranny of time in a fast-paced society, the failure of efforts to alleviate the spread of internal competition, and the construction of reverse identification in the dilemma of temporary escape. And under the combined force of the “I'm tanking and I'm happy” created by online carnival, the new form of digital labor derived from technological iteration, and the evaluation methods of quantifying social achievements and data calculation, the “tanking culture” has to some extent demonstrated the spiritual alienation of “self-doubt” and “self-negation”, the ideological crux of the labor alienation of “inferior games” and “digital gameplay”, as well as the self-alienation of “self-exploitation” and “self-exploitation”. In this regard, the mainstream ideology should introduce relevant policies and systems based on the diverse needs of youth to ensure the growth and development of youth, guide youth values with a new attitude of dialogue and inclusiveness, and take the construction of rule of law as the foothold to govern the cultural ecology of cyberspace.
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Received: 20 March 2023
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