Abstract：Relational contract is an important way of contract governance. The occurrence of relational contract of government purchasing public services follows the compensatory logic of dealing with subjects' bounded rationality, the instrumental logic of achieving non-verifiability goals and the beneficial logic of reducing transaction cost, However, latent risks are forming while it shows powerful application value. Through a systematic review, we found that in the process, including “establishment of demand, conclusion of contract, implementation of project, supervision for service and appraisal for performance” of government purchasing public services, “self-serving motivation” “interpenetration force” and “separation discourse” among purchasing subject, undertaking subject and consuming subject may induce “benefit screening” risk on relation preference, “rule shock” risk on informal institution, “task dislocation” risk in relation infiltration, “trust overdraft” risk in acquaintance circle and “deviation masking” risk in relation asylum. In order to promote “good governance” of the contract and healthy relationship of “government-society” during government purchasing public services, we need to find ways to prevent risks of the relational contract, so it is necessary to correct purchasing goal and take care of public discourse at the level of public service value, coordinate two-dimensional institution and reconcile plural interests at the level of partnerships value, construct trust network and portray ethical spirit at the level of relational contract value, improve the management technology and promote purchasing mechanism at the level of governance capacity value.
毛明明. 政府购买公共服务关系契约风险的生成、识别及防范[J]. 《深圳大学学报》（人文社科版）, 2023, 40(4): 97-106.
MAO Ming-ming. Generation, Identification and Prevention of Relational Contract Risks in Government Purchase of Public Services. , 2023, 40(4): 97-106.
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